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Abstract
In this article, we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by
a tree on the set of agents. Agents in the game can cooperate if they are connected in the tree.
We first derive direct-sum decompositions of the space of TU-games on a fixed tree, and two new
basis for these spaces of TU-games. We then focus our attention on the Average (rooted)-Tree
solution (see Herings, P., van der Laan, G., Talman, D., 2008. The Average Tree Solution for
Cycle-free Games. Games and Economic Behavior 62, 77-92). We provide a basis for its kernel
and a new axiomatic characterization by using the classical axiom for inessential games, and two
new axioms of invariance, namely Invariance with respect to irrelevant coalitions and Weighted
addition invariance on bi-partitions.
Keywords: Average Tree solution, Direct-sum decomposition, Kernel, Weighted addition
invariance on bi-partitions, Invariance to irrelevant coalitions
JEL: C71.
1. Introduction
In a cooperative game, cooperation is not always possible for all coalitions of agents. The
limited possibilities of cooperation can often be represented by an undirected graph in which
cooperation is only possible if agents are connected to each other. The study of the so-called
graph games was initiated by Myerson (1977) who introduced as solution concept the Myerson
value, which equals the Shapley value of the induced graph-restricted game. For the subclass of
cycle-free graph games, Herings et al. (2008) introduced the average tree solution (AT solution),
being the average of the marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all rooted spanning trees
of the graph. They characterize the AT solution by the classical axiom of component efficiency,
and by component fairness, which requires that deleting a link between two agents yields for both
resulting components the same average change in payoff, where the average is taken over the agents
in the component.
Ever since, this solution has received considerable attention in the literature. Other characteri-
zations on the class of cycle-free graph games have been provided by van den Brink (2009), Mishra
and Talman (2010), Be´al et al. (2010, 2012b) and Ju and Park (2012). Generalizations of the AT
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solution to the class of all graph games have been examined by Herings et al. (2010) and Baron et
al. (2011). The average tree solution has also been implemented by van den Brink et al. (2013),
and applied to and characterized in the richer frameworks of multichoice communication games by
Be´al et al. (2012a) and of games with a permission tree by van den Brink et al. (2014).
In this article, we provide a new characterization of the AT solution. Because we work with
a fixed graph, there is no loss of generality to assume that this graph is connected. We invoke
the classical axiom for inessential games as well as two other axioms of invariance. The axiom of
Invariance to irrelevant coalitions is based on the set of cones of a tree, which contains the grand
coalition, the empty coalition, and every pair of components obtained by removing a link from the
original tree. Only coalitions in this set are involved in the computation of the AT solution, and,
more generally, in the computations of marginalist tree solutions in the sense of Be´al et al. (2010).
The axiom of Invariance to irrelevant coalitions requires that the solution should prescribe the same
payoff vector in two tree games where the worths of all cones are the same.1 The axiom of Weighted
addition invariance on bi-partitions requires that the solution is not affected if the worths of each
of the two coalitions of a bi-partition of the agent set changes in proportion to their respective
size. On the class of tree games, we show that the AT solution is characterized by Invariance to
irrelevant coalitions, Weighted addition invariance on bi-partitions and the Inessential game axiom
(Proposition 4).
Our characterization of the AT solution does not rely on the classical axioms of efficiency,
contrary to all previous characterizations in the literature, and linearity, contrary to the charac-
terizations in Mishra and Talman (2010) and Be´al et al. (2010) where the graph is also fixed. It
is based on two axioms of invariance plus a punctual axiom. The proof of this characterization
is made easier by our second set of results. More specifically, we provide a basis for the kernel of
the AT solution for a given tree (Proposition 1), and two direct-sum decompositions of the set of
all cooperative games on a given agent set that rely on the tree under consideration (Proposition
2). Direct-sum decompositions are obtained through the games used to define Weighted addition
invariance on bi-partitions and Invariance to irrelevant coalitions respectively. These results clearly
underline new structural properties of the space of cooperative games on a fixed agent set and of
the AT solution. First, thanks to Proposition 1 and 2, we are able to provide two new basis for the
space of cooperative on a fixed agent set. These basis are indexed by the tree under consideration.
Second, knowing a basis of the kernel of the AT solution, it becomes easiest to understand how our
two axioms of invariance operate, and also to solve the following inverse problem. Given a payoff
vector, find the set of all games such that the AT solution allocates this payoff vector. We solve
this problem by showing that a game belongs to this solution set if and only if the total payoff
allocated to the members of a cone is equal to the worth of this cone plus a share, proportional to
the size of this cone, of the surplus created by the link incident to this cone and its complement
(Proposition 3). At last, another advantage of our method is that it proves very useful to show
logical independence of the axioms used in the characterizations. Although this approach has al-
ready been undertaken for cooperative games with no restriction on the cooperation possibilities
– see, for instance, Kleinberg and Weiss (1985), and more recently, Be´al et al., (2013) and Yokote
(2014) –, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time it is applied to graph games.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the definitions and
notations. Section 3 contains all the results. Precisely, section 3.1 provides a basis for the kernel
1A similar axiom, called cone equivalence, is used in Be´al et al. (2010) to characterize the class of marginalist
tree solutions.
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of AT and two direct-sum decompositions of the set of TU-games with respect to a fixed tree. In
section 3.2, we exploit these results to axiomatically characterize AT. Section 4 concludes.
2. Preliminaries
Throughout this article, the cardinality of a finite set S will be denoted by the lower case s,
the collection of all subsets of S will be denoted by 2S , and weak set inclusion will be denoted by
⊆. The complement S \T of a subset T of S is denoted by T c. Also for notational convenience, we
will write singleton {i} as i. Let V be a real linear space equipped with an inner product “·”. Its
additive identity element is denoted by 0V and its dimension by dim(V ). Given a linear subspace
U of V , we denote by U⊥ its orthogonal complement. If V is the direct sum of the subspaces V 1
and V 2, i.e. V = V 1 + V 2 and V 1 ∩ V 2 = {0V }, we write V = V 1 ⊕ V 2. If X is a non-empty
subset of V , then Sp(X) denotes the smallest subspace containing X. If f : V −→ U is a linear
mapping, then denote by Ker(f) its kernel, i.e. the set of vectors v ∈ V such that f(v) = 0U .
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a fixed and finite set of n agents. Each subset S of N is called a
coalition while N is called the grand coalition. A cooperative game with transferable utility or
simply a TU-game on a fixed agent set N is a function v : 2N −→ R such that v(∅) = 0. The
set of TU-games v on N , denoted by VN , forms a linear space where dim(VN ) = 2
n − 1. For each
coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) describes the worth of the coalition S when its members cooperate. For any
two TU-games v and w in VN and any α ∈ R, the TU-game αv+w ∈ VN is defined as follows: for
each S ⊆ N , (αv +w)(S) = αv(S) +w(S). The inner product v ·w is defined as ∑S⊆N v(S)w(S).
For any nonempty coalition T ⊆ N , the Dirac TU-game δT ∈ VN is defined as: δT (T ) = 1, and
δT (S) = 0 for each other S. Clearly, the collection of all Dirac TU-games is a basis for VN such that
v =
∑
{S∈2N :S 6=∅} v(S)δS for each v ∈ VN . We will also consider the TU-games δtT ∈ VN , T ⊆ N ,
T 6= ∅, defined as: δtT (T ) = t, and δtT (S) = 0 for each other S. Define the dictator TU-game ui, for
i ∈ N , as ui(S) = 1 if S 3 i, and ui(S) = 0 otherwise. A TU-game v ∈ VN is inessential if, for each
S ⊆ N such that S 6= ∅, v(S) = ∑i∈S v(i). The subset of inessential TU-games, denoted by I,
forms a subspace of VN such that dim(I) = n. A basis for I is the collection of dictator TU-games
{ui : i ∈ N}.
Assume that the set of agents N face restrictions on communication. The bilateral communica-
tion possibilities between the agents are represented by an undirected graph on N . An undirected
graph on N is a pair (N,L), where the set of nodes coincides with the set of agents N , and the
set of links L is a subset of the set LN of all unordered pairs of elements of N . As N is assumed
to be fixed in this article, we will denote without any risk of confusion (N,L) by L. A sequence
of distinct agents (i1, i2, . . . , ip), p ≥ 2, is a path in L if {iq, iq+1} ∈ L for q = 1, . . . , p − 1. Two
agents i and j are connected in L if i = j or there exists a path from i to j. A maximally set
(with respect to set inclusion) of connected agents is called a component of the graph. A graph L
is connected if N is the only component of the graph. A tree is a minimally connected graph L
in the sense that if a link is removed from L, L ceases to be connected. Equivalently, a tree is a
connected graph such that only one path connects any two agents. A leaf of L is an agent in N
who is incident to only one link. Following Be´al et al. (2010), the set of cones of L consists of N , ∅
and, for each {i, j} ∈ L, of the two connected components that are obtained after deletion of link
{i, j}. Every cone except N is called a proper cone. The unique agent of a nonempty proper cone
K who has a link with the complementary cone Kc = N\K is called the head of the cone and is
denoted by h(K). Thus, the tree L contains 2(n − 1) + 2 = 2n cones. Denote by ∆L the set of
cones of L, and by ∆0L the subset of nonempty proper cones of L.
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The combination of a tree L and a TU-game v ∈ VN is called a tree TU-game, and it is denoted
by (v, L). Following Be´al et al. (2012b), we say that (v, L) is cone-additive if:
∀{h(K), h(Kc)} ∈ L, v(N) = v(K) + v(Kc), and, ∀S ∈ 2N \∆L, v(S) = 0.
Denote by AL the subspace of TU-games v ∈ VN which are cone-additive on L.
A payoff vector x ∈ Rn for a tree TU-game (v, L) is an n-dimensional vector giving a payoff
xi ∈ R to each agent i ∈ N . A (single-valued) solution on the set of tree TU-games on N is a
function Φ that assigns to every tree TU-game (v, L) a payoff vector Φ(v, L) ∈ Rn. Such a solution
Φ represents a method for measuring the value of playing a particular role in a tree TU-game. In
this article, the set of links L is also assumed to be fixed, so that we consider solutions of the form
Φ(., L) : VN −→ Rn. Here is a list of classical axioms for a solution Φ(., L).
Efficiency A solution Φ(., L) is efficient if, for each v ∈ VN , it holds that:∑
i∈N
Φi(v, L) = v(N).
Linearity A solution Φ(., L) is linear if, for each v ∈ VN , each w ∈ VN and each α ∈ R, it holds
that:
Φ(αv + w,L) = αΦ(v, L) + Φ(w,L).
Inessential game axiom A solution Φ(., L) satisfies the inessential game axiom if, for each v ∈ I,
it holds that:
Φ(v, L) = (v(1), . . . , v(n)).
In order to calibrate the importance of each agent in the different coalitions, we define specific
contribution vectors as in Demange (2004) and Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2008). To
describe these contribution vectors we first give some definitions concerning rooted trees. By a
rooted tree ti, we mean a directed tree that arises from the tree L by selecting agent i ∈ N , called
the root, and directing all links away from the root. Each agent i ∈ N is the root of exactly one
rooted tree ti on L. Note also that for any rooted tree ti on L, any agent k ∈ N\{i}, there is
exactly one directed link (j, k); agent j is the unique predecessor of k and k is a successor of j
in ti. Denote by si(j) the possibly empty set of successors of agent j ∈ N in ti. An agent k is a
subordinate of j in ti if there is a directed path from j to k, i.e. if there is a sequence of distinct
agents (i1, i2, . . . , ip) such that i1 = j, ip = k and for each q = 1, 2, . . . , p − 1, iq+1 ∈ si(iq). The
set Si[j] denotes the union of the set of all subordinates of j in ti and coalition formed by j. Note
that:
∆L =
{
Si[j] : {i, j} ∈ LN
}
∪
{
∅
}
. (1)
In particular, for each i ∈ N , Si[i] = N .
Pick any v ∈ VN , any rooted tree ti of L, and consider the marginal contribution vector mi(v, L)
on Rn defined as:
∀j ∈ N, mij(v, L) = v(Si[j])−
∑
k∈si(j)
v(Si[k]). (2)
The marginal contribution mij(v, L) of j ∈ N in ti is thus equal to the worth of the coalition
consisting of agent j and all his subordinates in ti minus the sum of the worths of the coalitions
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consisting of any successor of j and all subordinates of this successor in ti. Note that for each tree
TU-game (v, L), each rooted tree ti of L, and each agent j ∈ N , we have:∑
k∈Si[j]
mik(v) = v(Si[j]). (3)
Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2008) introduce the Average Tree solution, denoted by AT,
which assigns to every tree TU-game (v, L) the average of all marginal contribution vectorsmi(v, L),
i.e.
AT(v, L) =
1
n
∑
i∈N
mi(v, L). (4)
Remark From (2), (3) and (4), we easily conclude that AT(., L) is linear, efficient, and satisfies
the Inessential game axiom. From the Inessential game axiom, we deduce that AT(., L) is onto.
In order to characterize AT(·, L), we introduce two new axioms.
Weighted addition invariance on bi-partitions A solution Φ(., L) on VN is invariant to addi-
tion on bi-partitions if, for each v ∈ VN , each α ∈ R, and each nonempty coalition S ⊆ N , it holds
that:
Φ(v + α(δsS + δ
sc
Sc), L) = Φ(v, L).
The use of bi-partitions of N has been suggested by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953)
and exploited by Evans (1996) who considers a bargaining procedure between two representative
agents of a randomly chosen bi-partition. We also exploit this idea here by assuming that in a
game v ∈ VN the grand coalition N splits into two coalitions S and Sc that bargain on the surplus
v(N) − v(S) − v(Sc) they can create by cooperating. In a sense, the worths v(S) and v(Sc) are
the bargaining powers of these two bargaining coalitions. The axiom of Weighted addition invari-
ance on bi-partitions indicates that if the worths of S and its complement Sc vary by an amount
proportional to their respective size, then this change should not affect the resulting payoff vector.
Observe that the per-capita variation is the same within the two elements of the bi-partition, which
is important since their respective size can be different.
The last axiom states that the payoffs only depend on the worths of cones.
Invariance to irrelevant coalitions A solution Φ(., L) is invariant to irrelevant coalitions if, for
each v ∈ VN , each S ∈ 2N \∆L, and each α ∈ R, it holds that:
Φ(v + αδS , L) = Φ(v, L).
This type of axioms is used to characterize solutions in TU-games on combinatorial structures (see,
for instance, van den Brink et al., 2011). From (1), (2), and (4), we easily see that AT(., L) satisfies
Invariance to irrelevant coalitions.
3. Results
Section 3.1 provides a basis for the kernel of AT(·, L) and two direct-sum decompositions of VN
with respect to L. We also obtain, as a by-product of these results, new basis for VN with respect
to L. In section 3.2, we exploit all these results to axiomatically characterize AT(·, L).
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3.1. A basis for the kernel of AT(·, L), and two decompositions of VN
Denote by BL the subset of TU-games defined as:
BL =
{
δkK + δ
kc
Kc : K ∈ ∆0L,K 3 1
}⋃{
δS : S ∈ 2N \∆L
}
. (5)
Proposition 1 For any tree L on N , it holds that BL is a basis for Ker(AT(., L)).
Proof. Because AT is onto, we have:
dim(Ker(AT(., L))) = 2n − 1− n.
Consider the subset of TU-games BL given by (5). Its cardinality is:
(n− 1) + 2n − 2n = 2n − 1− n.
It is straightforward to see that that the elements of this subset of TU-games are linearly indepen-
dent. Indeed, take any linear combination equal to the identity element:∑
K∈∆0L,K31
αK,Kc(δ
k
K + δ
kc
Kc) +
∑
S∈2N\∆L
αSδS = 0VN .
Pick any nonempty coalition T . If T ∈ ∆0L and T 3 1, we have:∑
K∈∆0L,K31
αK,Kc(δ
k
K + δ
kc
Kc)(T ) +
∑
S∈2N\∆L
αSδS(T ) = αT,T c(δ
t
T + δ
tc
T c)(T ) = tαT,T c = 0,
Thus, αT,T c = 0. If T ∈ 2N \∆L, we have:∑
K∈∆0L,K31
αK,Kc(δ
k
K + δ
kc
Kc)(T ) +
∑
S∈2N\∆L
αSδS(T ) = αT δT (T ) = αT = 0.
Therefore, the vectors of the set (5) are linearly independent. Next, from (2) and (4), we easily
verify that AT(v, L) does not depend on the worths v(S), S ∈ 2N \∆L. Consider first any TU-game
δS , S ∈ 2N \∆L. By the above remark and the linearity of AT(v, L), we have:
AT(δS , L) = AT(0VN + δS , L) = AT(0VN , L) = 0Rn .
Now, pick any TU-game δkK + δ
kc
Kc , for some nonempty proper cone K ∈ ∆0L. Consider the head
h(K) of the proper cone K, and pick any root i of L. Two cases arise. If i ∈ K, by (2), we have:
mih(K)(δ
k
K + δ
kc
Kc) = −δk
c
Kc(K
c) = −kc
If i ∈ Kc, by (2) we have:
mih(K)(δ
k
K + δ
kc
Kc) = δ
k
K(K) = k.
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By (4), this gives:
ATh(K)(δ
k
K + δ
kc
Kc , L) =
1
n
∑
i∈N
mih(K)(δ
k
K + δ
kc
Kc , L)
=
1
n
∑
i∈K
mih(K)(δ
k
K + δ
kc
Kc , L) +
1
n
∑
i∈Kc
mih(K)(δ
k
K + δ
kc
Kc , L)
=
1
n
(−kkc + kck)
= 0.
By a symmetric argument we obtain:
ATh(Kc)(δ
k
K + δ
kc
Kc , L) = 0.
For each agent i distinct from h(K) and h(Kc), we easily get from (2) and (4):
ATi(δ
k
K + δ
kc
Kc , L) = 0, and so AT(δ
k
K + δ
kc
Kc , L) = 0Rn .
Therefore, BL ⊆ Ker(AT). Because the 2n − 1− n elements of BL are linearly independent, they
constitute a basis for Ker(AT(., L)), and so Ker(AT(., L)) = Sp(BL), as desired. 
For each i ∈ N , define the TU-game zi as:
zi =
∑
{K∈∆L:K3i}
δK . (6)
Define ZL as:
ZL =
{
zi ∈ VN : i ∈ N
}
. (7)
Proposition 2 Consider any tree L on N, and the sets BL and ZL given by (5) and (7), respec-
tively. The following statements hold:
1. The set ZL forms a basis for the subspace of cone-additive tree-games AL.
2. VN = Sp(BL)⊕AL, and VN = Sp(BL)⊕ I.
3. The sets BL ∪ ZL and BL ∪ {ui : i ∈ N} form two basis for VN with respect to L.
Proof. Statement 1. We proceed in three steps. First we show that the n elements of ZL are
linearly independent. In a second step, we show that ZL ⊆ AL. In a last step, we show that
dim(AL) = n.
Step 1. Pick any linear combination of the elements of ZL equal to the identity element:∑
i∈N
αiz
i = 0VN . (8)
Assume, without loss of generality, that the elements of N are labeled in the following way: each
i ∈ N is a leaf of the (sub)tree obtained by deleting the agents 1, 2, . . . , i− 1 in L. We proceed by
induction on N .
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Initial step: Because the singleton formed by agent 1 is a cone, by (8), we obtain:∑
i∈N
αiz
i(1) = α1 = 0.
Induction hypothesis: Assume that αj = 0 for j < i ≤ n.
Induction step: Consider agent i. By definition of L, there exists a unique cone, say K, such
that h(K) = i and K ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , i}. By (8), we have:∑
i∈N
αiz
i(K) =
∑
j∈K
αj = 0.
Since K ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , i}, the induction hypothesis leads to: αj = 0 for each j ∈ K \ i. This forces
αi = 0.
Conclude that the elements of ZL are linearly independent. This completes the proof of Step
1.
Step 2. Pick any element zi ∈ ZL and any link {h(K), h(Kc)} ∈ L. By definition of proper a
cone, either i ∈ K or i ∈ Kc. Assume, without loss of generality, that i ∈ K. By definition of zi,
we have:
zi(K) = 1, zi(Kc) = 0 and zi(N) = 1,
which proves that zi ∈ AL, and so ZL ⊆ AL, as desired.
Step 3. Define the subspace W of VN as W = Sp(C) where
C =
({
δS : S ∈ 2N \∆L
}⋃{
δK + δKc − δN : K ∈ ∆0L,K 3 1
})
.
The generating set C of W contains 2n − 2n + (n − 1) = 2n − n − 1 elements which are linearly
independent. We also have : AL = W
⊥, where
W⊥ =
{
v ∈ VN : ∀w ∈ C, w · v = 0
}
.
Because W ⊕W⊥ = VN , we obtain:
dim(AL) = dim(W⊥) = dim(VN )− dim(W ) = 2n − 1− (2n − n− 1) = n.
Combining Steps 1-3, we obtain that ZL is a basis for AL, which completes the proof of Statement 1.
Statement 2. We first prove that VN = Sp(BL)⊕AL, where AL = Sp(ZL) by Statement 1. By
Proposition 1 and Statement 1, we already know that:
dim(Sp(BL)) + dim(AL) = 2
n − 1− n+ n = 2n − 1 = dim(VN ).
It remains to prove that Sp(BL) ∩ AL = {0VN }. So, pick any v ∈ Sp(BL) ∩ AL. Because ZL is a
basis for AL, if v ∈ AL, then there exist unique real numbers αi, i ∈ N , such that:
v =
∑
i∈N
αiz
i.
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Applying AT(., L) to v, we get by linearity of AT(., L):
AT(v, L) = AT
(∑
i∈N
αiz
i, L
)
=
∑
i∈N
αiAT(z
i, L).
Consider the payoff vector AT(zi, L) for some i ∈ N . Note that zi and the dictator TU-game ui
(an inessential TU-game) are cone equivalent in the sense that ui(K) = z
i(K) for each K ∈ ∆N .
Because AT(., L) satisfies Invariance to irrelevant coalitions and the Inessential game property, we
immediately get ATi(z
i, L) = ATi(ui, L) = 1 and ATj(z
i, L) = ATj(ui, L) = 0 for any j ∈ N \ i.
Therefore, from (9), we obtain:
AT(v, L) =
∑
i∈N
αiAT(z
i, L) = (α1, . . . , αn).
On the other hand, v ∈ Sp(BL). By Proposition 1, Sp(BL) = Ker(AT(., L)), which implies
AT(v, L) = 0Rn , and so 0 = αi for each i ∈ N . Thus, v = 0VN , as desired. Conclude that
VN = Sp(BL)⊕AL.
To show that VN = Sp(BL)⊕ I, it suffices to proceed in a similar way and to apply the Inessential
game axiom to AT(v, L), v ∈ I.
Statement 3 is a direct consequence of Statements 1-2, Proposition 1 and the fact the collection
{ui : i ∈ N} is a basis for I.

Thanks to Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, we are able to solve the following inverse problem:
given the payoff vector (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Rn , find all v ∈ VN such that:
AT(v, L) = (α1, . . . , αn).
This problem is solved by using the decompositions of VN contained in Proposition 2. Consider,
without loss of generality, the decomposition VN = Sp(BL) ⊕ I, where I = Sp({ui : i ∈ VN}).
Because VN = Sp(BL)⊕ I, each v ∈ VN is the sum of exactly one TU-game in Sp(BL) and exactly
one inessential TU-game in I. Therefore, from the equality Sp(BL) = Ker(AT(v, L)) and the fact
that AT(v, L) satisfies the Inessential game property:
AT(v, L) = (α1, . . . , αn) if and only if v = v
1 +
∑
i∈N
αiui for some v
1 ∈ Sp(BL).
The TU-game v1 admits a unique decomposition along the elements of BL :
v1 =
∑
{K∈∆0L:K31}
αK,Kc(δ
k
K + δ
kc
Kc) +
∑
S∈2N\∆L
v1(S)δS .
Regarding the coordinates αK,Kc note that:
∀K ∈ ∆0L,K 3 1, v(K) = αK,Kck+
∑
i∈K
αi, v(K
c) = αK,Kc(n− k) +
∑
i∈Kc
αi, and v(N) =
∑
i∈N
αi.
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Combining these equalities, we obtain:
∀K ∈ ∆0L : K 3 1, αK,Kc = −n−1(v(N)− v(K)− v(Kc)).
In such a TU-game v ∈ VN , it holds that:
∀K ∈ ∆L, v(K) = −n−1k(v(N)− v(K)− v(Kc)) +
∑
i∈K
αi.
From this, we obtain the following characterization.
Proposition 3 Given the payoff vector (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Rn, we have:
AT(v, L) = (α1, . . . , αn) if and only if, ∀K ∈ ∆L,
∑
i∈K
αi = v(K) + n
−1k(v(N)− v(K)− v(Kc)).
Proposition 3 indicates that v ∈ VN belongs to the solution set if and only if the total payoff
distributed to the members of the cone N is equal to v(N) by Efficiency of AT(v, L), and the
total payoff distributed to the members of each proper cone K is equal to its worth plus a share,
proportional to the size k of K, of the surplus created by the link {h(K), h(Kc)} ∈ L.
3.2. Characterization
Using the results contained in section 3.1 we easily derive the following new characterization of
AT(., L).
Proposition 4 Let L be any tree on N . The Average Tree solution AT(., L) is the unique solution
which satisfies Invariance to irrelevant coalitions, Addition invariance on bi-partitions, and the
Inessential game axiom.
Proof. We have already underlined that AT(., L) satisfies Invariance to irrelevant coalitions and
the Inessential game axiom. It remains to verify that it satisfies Weighted addition invariance on
bi-partitions. Pick any nonempty S ∈ 2N , S 6= N . If S 6∈ ∆L,
AT(v + α(δsS + δ
sc
Sc), L) = AT(v, L),
by Invariance to irrelevant coalitions. If S ∈ ∆L,
AT(v + α(δsS + δ
sc
Sc), L) = AT(v, L),
by linearity of AT(., L) and the fact that δsS + δ
sc
Sc ∈ Ker(AT(., L)) by Proposition 1. So, AT(., L)
satisfies Addition invariance on bi-partitions.
Regarding the uniqueness part, assume that the solution Φ(., L) satisfies the four axioms in the
statement of Proposition 4. By Proposition 2 we have:
VN = Sp(BL)⊕ I, and BL ∪ {ui : i ∈ N} is a basis for VN .
Thus any v ∈ VN admits a unique linear decomposition along the elements of BL ∪ {ui : i ∈ N}:
v =
∑
K∈∆0L,K31
αK,Kc(δ
k
K + δ
kc
Kc) +
∑
S∈2N\∆L
αSδS +
∑
i∈N
βiui.
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By successive applications of Invariance to irrelevant coalitions, we get:
Φ(v, L) = Φ
( ∑
K∈∆0L,K31
αK,Kc(δ
k
K + δ
kc
Kc) +
∑
S∈2N\∆L
αSδS +
∑
i∈N
βiui
)
= Φ
( ∑
K∈∆0L,K31
αK,Kc(δ
k
K + δ
kc
Kc) +
∑
i∈N
βiui
)
.
By successive applications of Weighted addition invariance on bi-partitions, we get:
Φ(v, L) = Φ
( ∑
K∈∆0L,K31
αK,Kc(δ
k
K + δ
kc
Kc) +
∑
i∈N
βiui
)
= Φ
(∑
i∈N
βiui
)
.
By the Inessential game axiom, we obtain:
Φ(v, L) = Φ
(∑
i∈N
βiui
)
= (β1, . . . , βn),
which proves that Φ(v) is uniquely determined. This completes the proof of Proposition 4. 
To prove the logical independence of the axioms used in the two characterizations, we proceed
as follows.
• To prove that Invariance to irrelevant coalitions is logically independent of the two other axioms,
we proceed as follows. Define the subspace U of VN as:
U = Sp
({
δsS + δ
sc
Sc : S ∈ 2N , S 3 1, S 6= N
})
.
We have: dim(U) = 2n−1 − 1. Note that U ∩ I contains the subspace of constant inessential
TU-games IC :
IC = Sp
({∑
i∈N
ui
})
, where dim(IC) = 1.
From this remark, we obtain:
dim(U + I) ≤ dim(U) + dim(I)− dim(IC) = 2n−1 − 1 + n− 1 < 2n − 1 = dim(VN ).
Combining this inequality with the fact that
U + I + Sp
({
δS : S ∈ 2N \∆L
})
= VN ,
we conclude that there exists a subspace
W ⊆ Sp
({
δS : S ∈ 2N \∆L
})
such that VN = (U + I)⊕W.
Therefore, for each v ∈ VN , there exist exactly one v1 ∈ U + I and exactly one w ∈W such that:
v = v1 + w.
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Next, construct the solution Φ as follows:
Φ(v, L) = AT(v) + Ψ(w,L) where ∃w ∈W such that Ψ(w,L) 6= 0Rn .
This solution satisfies Addition invariance on bi-partitions, the Inessential game axiom but violates
Invariance to irrelevant coalitions due to the fact that there exists at least one
w ∈W ⊆ Sp
({
δS : S ∈ 2N \∆L
})
such that Ψ(w,L) 6= 0Rn .
• To prove that Addition invariance on bi-partitions is logically independent of the other two
axioms, we proceed as follows. We know that each v ∈ VN admits a unique decomposition along
the elements of BL ∪ {ui : i ∈ N}:
v =
∑
K∈∆0L,K31
αK,Kc(δ
k
K + δ
kc
Kc) +
∑
S∈2N\∆L
αSδS +
∑
i∈N
βiui.
Define Φ as:
Φ(v, L) = AT(v, L) + Ψ
( ∑
K∈∆0L,K31
αK,Kc(δ
k
K + δ
kc
Kc), L
)
,
such that Ψ satisfies the following condition:
∃w ∈ Sp
({
δkK + δ
kc
Kc : K ∈ ∆0L,K 3 1
})
such that Ψ(w,L) 6= 0Rn .
The solution Φ satisfies Invariance to irrelevant coalitions and the Inessential game axiom, but
violates Addition invariance on bi-partitions.
• To prove that the Inessential game axiom is logically independent of the two other axioms, con-
sider the null solution Φ(v, L) = 0Rn for each v ∈ VN . This solution satisfies Invariance to irrelevant
coalitions, Addition invariance on bi-partitions but violates the Inessential game axiom.
We conclude that Invariance to irrelevant coalitions, Addition invariance on bi-partitions, and
the Inessential game axiom are logically independent.
4. Conclusion
Since many allocation rules on graph TU-games are linear, it would be interesting to find
relevant basis of their kernel with respect to the underlying graph in order to construct new
axioms of invariance and/or covariance suitable to build new characterizations of these allocation
rules. Though this approach has been recently applied to classical TU-games – see, for instance,
Be´al et al. (2013) and Yokote, (2014) – it has not been yet deeper investigated in the field of graph
TU-games.
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